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COURT-SIDE SEATS?  
THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
AND THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO STUBHUB 
AND PEER-TO-PEER MARKETPLACES 
Abstract: In 1996, Congress passed section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act, which provides broad immunity to websites from vicarious liability for the 
content produced by its users. Despite this broad immunity, a website will be lia-
ble for its user’s content when it is deemed to be an “information content provid-
er” itself. In 2008, in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Room-
mates.com, LLC, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a website is an in-
formation content provider and thus loses immunity when it “materially contrib-
utes to the alleged unlawfulness” of the content. Although most courts have fol-
lowed this “material contribution test,” the test has lead to diverging opinions as 
to immunity for peer-to-peer marketplace websites, such as StubHub. This Note 
proposes a new test in line with Congress’s intent to provide broad immunity un-
der section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. 
INTRODUCTION 
Walking around Yawkey Way near Fenway Park, an observer will hear 
“buying tickets, selling tickets?” along with the cries of the sausage and game-
day program vendors.1 In open disregard for rarely enforced anti-scalping 
laws, brokers resell tickets, creating a secondary market that is now a five bil-
lion dollar industry.2 Traditionally, brokers meander through the crowds at-
tempting to profit off the economics of supply and demand.3 Increasingly, 
however, these on-site brokers are struggling to compete with the lower infor-
mation costs and absence of geographic constraints on the Internet.4 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Robert Mays, Losses Are Piling Up for Scalpers, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.
boston.com/sports/baseball/redsox/articles/2010/08/17/losses_piling_up_lately_for_areas_scalpers_
at_fenway_park/ [perma.cc/XQX9-LN8Z] (describing the scene around Fenway Park on game day); 
Darren Rovell, Inflation in Red Sox Nation, ESPN (Oct. 11, 2003), http://espn.go.com/page2/s/
rovell/031013.html [perma.cc/V7SB-PHX4] (describing the task of scalping Red Sox tickets on game 
day). 
 2 Eric Schroeder et al., A Brief Overview on Ticket Scalping Laws, Secondary Ticket Markets, and 
the StubHub Effect, 30 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 26 (2012); Rovell, supra note 1. 
 3 See Mays, supra note 1; Rovell, supra note 1. 
 4 See John George, That’s the Ticket, PHILA. BUS. J. (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.
com/philadelphia/print-edition/2013/12/20/thats-the-ticket.html [perma.cc/ZTT3-SDBY] (describing 
the effect of the Internet on the offline marketplace); Joe Nocera, Scalpers Are Arbitragers of the 
Arena, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/business/worldbusiness/
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Through peer-to-peer marketplaces, such as StubHub, buyers and sellers 
now have access to the secondary ticket market without having to leave their 
living rooms.5 StubHub does not buy or sell tickets itself but simply connects 
buyers and sellers, charging a service fee.6 As the leader in the online second-
ary ticket market, StubHub generated $500 million in revenue in 2013, with $3 
billion worth of tickets sold on its site.7 By providing tools like historical pric-
ing data, virtual seating maps, and seamless payment, StubHub offers an expe-
rience that is unlike the traditional on-site marketplace.8 
With no maximum or minimum price restraints, StubHub lets the eco-
nomics of supply and demand run their course.9 For high-profile events, like 
the Super Bowl, demand greatly exceeds supply, resulting in ticket prices on 
the secondary market more than ten times their face value.10 The imbalance of 
supply and demand can be affected by a number of factors, including the 
weather, the opponent, or the potential for a record-breaking moment.11 Con-
                                                                                                                           
18iht-wbjoe19.html?pagewanted=all [perma.cc/UGQ3-5VNL] (detailing the boom of the secondary 
ticket market). 
 5 Benny Evangelista, StubHub App Lets Fans Skip Scalping for Giants Tickets, SFGATE (Aug. 26, 
2011), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/StubHub-app-lets-fans-skip-scalpers-for-Giants-2333231.php 
[perma.cc/NJ8Y-26D2] (highlighting new technologies that allow customers to buy tickets entirely on 
their mobile devices); Neal Karlinsky, StubHub, Revolutionizing the Modern-Day Ticket Scalper, 
ABC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/stubhub-revolutionizing-modern-day-
ticket-scalper/story?id=18421695 [perma.cc/UVX3-6XZW] (referencing StubHub as the “ultimate 
middleman” in the marketplace today). 
 6 See Sean Cassidy, How StubHub Works—Processes and User Interface, http://project4.wiki.
usfca.edu/How+StubHub+Works+-+Processes+and+User+Interface [https://perma.cc/J3KN-QKHM]; 
Darren Rovell, Talking the Future of Sports Tickets with StubHub’s CEO, CNBC (Apr. 26, 2011, 3:46 
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/42767788# [perma.cc/H5VN-ZR68] (discussing StubHub’s business 
model). 
 7 Adam Satariano, The Case of the Stubbed Hub, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2015, 6:48 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-19/stubhub-faces-pressure-from-ticketmaster-and-ebay-
its-own-parent [perma.cc/CA3Z-X5P6]. 
 8 See Cassidy, supra note 6 (describing StubHub’s interface and processes); Satariano, supra note 
7. 
 9 See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26 (explaining the basic economic tenets of supply and de-
mand); Rovell, supra note 6 (discussing dynamic pricing with the CEO of StubHub). 
 10 See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26; Jesse Lawrence, Welcome to the Subprime Super Bowl 
Ticket Crisis, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/29/the-
same-thing-that-ruined-the-housing-market-is-now-ruining-the-super-bowl.html [perma.cc/FU8U-
5UDU] (detailing the events that led to the most expensive Super Bowl in history); Rovell, supra note 
1; Darren Rovell, SB XLIX Tickets Priciest in History, ESPN (Feb. 1, 2015, 5:02 PM), http://espn.
go.com/nfl/playoffs/2014/story/_/id/12263047/super-bowl-xlix-tickets-most-expensive-game-history 
[perma.cc/SW39-K2HC] (explaining StubHub’s role in the Super Bowl with the highest priced tickets 
ever seen). 
 11 See Brandon Formby, Novelty of First College Football Playoff Championship Isn’t Driving 
Ticket Demand, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 7, 2015), http://sportsday.dallasnews.com/college-
sports/collegesheadlines/2015/01/06/novelty-of-first-college-football-playoff-championship-isn-t-
driving-ticket-demand [perma.cc/MX5B-JPFE] (describing the influence of factors like travel and in-
state interest on ticket prices); Rovell, supra note 6 (discussing the impact of supply and demand on 
the secondary ticket market). For example, shortly after Derek Jeter announced he would be retiring at 
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versely, when the supply of tickets greatly exceeds the demand, StubHub is 
home to ticket prices that are far below face value.12 
Despite the increasing popularity of websites like StubHub, most states 
still have anti-scalping laws.13 These laws usually focus on physical scalping 
around a stadium, or reselling over a specified price above face value.14 These 
tactics and other regulatory measures are harder to enforce online, where iden-
tity and physical presence are masked.15 
The rise of the online peer-to-peer marketplaces creates new issues of le-
gal liability.16 The core issue is whether the host of a peer-to-peer marketplace 
could be vicariously liable for the actions of its users.17 Plaintiffs have attempt-
ed to hold StubHub liable for scalping violations, unfair trade practices, or tor-
tious interference with contractual relations.18 Websites generally succeed in 
                                                                                                                           
the end of the 2014 season the average ticket price for his last home game jumped from $139 to $500. 
Brad Tuttle, As Jeter Farewell Tour Wraps Up, Ticket Sellers Cash In, TIME (July 30, 2014), 
http://time.com/money/3052954/derek-jeter-yankees-farewell-tour-ticket-prices/ [perma.cc/37NV-
BLJG]. 
 12 Adam Rubin, Study Compares Mets, StubHub Prices, ESPN (Feb. 25, 2013, 11:23 AM), http://
espn.go.com/blog/new-york/mets/post/_/id/61415/study-compares-mets-stubhub-prices [perma.cc/
GQ9P-4CHB] (finding StubHub prices to be cheaper on average than the primary market for New 
York Mets tickets). Even for the popular New York Yankees, ticket prices on StubHub are consistent-
ly lower on average than the face value. Garett Sloane, Yanks’ New Ticket Exchange Service Battles 
StubHub, N.Y. POST, (Feb. 25, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/02/19/yanks-new-ticket-exchange-
service-battles-stubhub/ [perma.cc/ZQ8K-HQC4]. 
 13 See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26. State scalping laws are becoming increasingly less strict as 
legislators recognize the economic benefits of allowing the booming secondary ticket market go un-
regulated. See Max Lewontin, Massachusetts Lawmakers Eye Changing Law On Reselling Sports, 
Concert Tickets, SUN CHRON. (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.thesunchronicle.com/news/local_news/
massachusetts-lawmakers-eye-changing-laws-on-reselling-sports-concert-tickets/article_7582c7b8-2b11-
53a3-933f-134cddd296bd.html [perma.cc/2KTN-79M3]. 
 14 See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26; Myles Kaufman, The Curious Case of US Ticket Resale 
Laws, SEATGEEK (Sept. 10, 2014), https://seatgeek.com/tba/articles/ticket-resale-laws/ [perma.cc/
MVR4-K4Y3] (providing an overview of state anti-scalping law). 
 15 See Kaufman, supra note 14 (explaining how anti-scalping laws are outdated); Nocera, supra 
note 4 (describing a new era of online scalpers). 
 16 See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 554 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that StubHub is 
immune from anti-scalping law violations); Jeffrey R. Doty, Note, Inducement or Solicitation? Com-
peting Interpretations of the “Underlying Illegality” Test in the Wake of Roommates.com, 6 WASH. J. 
L. TECH. & ARTS 125, 126 (2010) (exploring the inconsistent application of the CDA); Ryan J.P. 
Dyer, Note, The Communications Decency Act Gone Wild: A Case for Renewing the Presumption 
Against Preemption, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 837, 845–46 (2014) (describing the uncertainty about 
how immunity is applied); Eric Weslander, Comment, Murky “Development”: How the Ninth Circuit 
Exposed Ambiguity Within the Communications Decency Act, and Why Internet Publishers Should 
Worry, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 277–79 (2008) (explaining how immunity is applied under the CDA). 
 17 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 551–57; Doty, supra note 16, at 126; Weslander, supra note 16, at 177–
79. 
 18 See, e.g., Weinstein v. eBay, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 219, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting a de-
ceptive business practice claim); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 551–57 (holding that StubHub is immune from 
anti-scalping law violations); NPS, LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 25 Mass. L. Rptr. 478, 485 (Super. Ct. 
2009) (holding StubHub secondarily liable for an unfair trade practices violation). 
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defending claims for vicarious liability under the Communications Decency 
Act (“CDA” or “the Act”), but there has been uncertainty as it pertains to 
StubHub.19 
The CDA gives a website immunity from vicarious liability for the ac-
tions of its users, unless the website is responsible “in whole or in part, for the 
creation or development” of the information that is the focus of the lawsuit.20 
Courts have split on how to define “development.”21 In 2008, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals proposed a now popular definition, which denies a website 
immunity if it “materially contributes to the alleged unlawfulness” of the in-
formation.22 When this test has been applied to StubHub, however, courts have 
reached different conclusions as to StubHub’s liability for its users’ actions.23 
This Note argues that a new test is needed to eliminate the ambiguity in 
applying CDA immunity, in line with Congress’s test.24 Part I discusses the 
CDA, the courts’ diverging interpretations of its key terms, and StubHub’s re-
liance on immunity.25 Part II examines the conflicting opinions on StubHub’s 
liability and the threat to other peer-to-peer marketplaces.26 Part III argues that 
a new test is needed and proposes a clearer test for CDA immunity.27 
I. SECTION 230 OF THE CDA AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO STUBHUB 
To understand the effect of section 230 of the CDA on StubHub, this Part 
explains the Act’s purpose, statutory text, and the courts’ application of its key 
terms.28 Section A of this Part discusses the undesirable outcome that results 
from applying offline notions of third-party liability to the Internet, prompting 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 554 (holding that StubHub is not liable vicariously for the anti-scalping 
law violations of its users); Doty, supra note 16 at 126 (noting that most courts have found for broad 
immunity for websites). But see NPS, 25 Mass.L.Rptr. at 485 (holding StubHub liable for unfair trade 
practices violations). 
 20 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f) (2012); Doty, supra note 16, at 128. 
 21 See Shiamilli v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (N.Y. 2011) (stating 
that “no consensus has emerged” as to what “development” means); Doty, supra note 16 at 126–27, 
130–31, 136 (explaining the diverging treatments of CDA immunity); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46. 
 22 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1667–68 (9th Cir. 2008) (interpreting development to mean “materially contributing to its alleged 
unlawfulness,” such as contributing to the defamation). 
 23 Compare Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 554 (holding StubHub immune from anti-scalping law violations), 
with NPS, 25 Mass.L.Rptr. at 485 (holding StubHub liable under the CDA for its “knowing participa-
tion” in unfair trade practices). 
 24 See infra notes 239–256 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 28–123 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 124–170 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 171–256 and accompanying text. 
 28 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–34 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing Congress’s 
clear purpose in enacting the CDA); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 551–57; Doty, supra note 16, at 127–28 (out-
lining the application of the CDA); Weslander, supra note 16, at 279. 
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the need for section 230 of the CDA.29 Section A then explores the statutory text 
of the CDA and its litigated terms.30 Section B introduces the Roommates.com 
“material contribution” test and summarizes the two different approaches courts 
have taken when applying this test, leading to ambiguity affecting StubHub.31 
Section C explains StubHub’s business and reliance on CDA immunity.32 
A. A Fix Is Needed: A Threat to Online Actors Prompting the Birth of the 
CDA, and the Lingering Question of When a Website Is  
Deemed to Be an “Information Content Provider” 
Prior to the CDA, liability for Internet service providers of third-party con-
tent depended on offline notions of publishers versus distributors.33 Under this 
distinction, publishers, such as newspapers, were liable for any defamatory 
comments they published and over which they had control.34 In contrast, distrib-
utors, such as bookstores, were immune from liability if they had no knowledge 
of the defamatory material they circulated.35 Thus, if a website or Internet forum 
exhibited control or knew of alleged defamatory statements, it became liable for 
those statements as a publisher.36 
The offline analogy of publishers and distributors encouraged online 
companies to refrain from monitoring the content their users posted.37 For ex-
                                                                                                                           
 29 See infra notes 33–58 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 33–58 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 59–109 and accompanying text. If a website “materially contributes” to a con-
tent’s unlawfulness, it will lose immunity under the CDA under the test announced in Room-
mates.com. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1667–68; see Doty, supra note 16, at 129–30 (describing the 
court’s holding in Roommates.com); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46; Weslander, supra note 16, at 269 
(detailing the court’s holding in Roommates.com). The point at which an interactive computer service 
also becomes an information content provider is the point at which the interactive community service 
loses immunity under the CDA. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1667–68; Doty, supra note 16, at 
127–28; Weslander, supra note 16, at 279. 
 32 See infra notes 110–123 and accompanying text. 
 33 See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that pub-
lishers become distributors if they have knowledge or reason to know of defamatory content). 
 34 See id. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See id. at 139–41; Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 
323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding Prodigy liable for the defamatory statements of 
its user because it exhibited control over the content). 
 37 See Shiamilli, 952 N.E.2d at 1016 (explaining the downside that existed if a website monitored 
its users’ content); Matthew Schruers, Note, The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third 
Party Content, 88 VA. L. REV. 205, 211–13 (2002) (describing the outcome of the Stratton Oakmont 
case). In 1991, in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York held that a host of an online journalism forum, CompuServe, was immune from liability 
because it acted as a distributor. See 776 F. Supp. at 141. The journalism forum hosted a specific pub-
lication called “Rumorville” over which it exercised no control. See id. at 137. CompuServe allowed 
users to contribute their own unedited content and did not have knowledge of the alleged defamatory 
statements posted by a user. See id. at 137–38. The district court noted that CompuServe lacked con-
trol over the content before being disseminated, and that imposing liability otherwise would result in 
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ample, in 1995, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., the New 
York Supreme Court held that a host of an online bulletin board was liable for 
the defamatory statements of its user because it exercised editorial control.38 
Prodigy hosted a network of two million subscribers communicating over var-
ious topic-specific forums.39 Prodigy marketed itself as a family-friendly ser-
vice due to its editorial control, which was accomplished through automatic 
screening software and board leaders overseeing the content.40 The court held 
that these actions made Prodigy a publisher and thus liable for the content its 
users post.41 In this way, Prodigy’s good faith efforts to monitor its bulletin 
boards resulted in liability.42 
In a response to the Stratton Oakmont decision, Congress passed section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act.43 Congress provided protection for 
websites in § 230 by unequivocally declaring them immune from civil liability 
for the content of a user as long as the website is not “responsible, in whole or 
in part, for the creation or development” of that information.44 The Act further 
grants immunity to any website that attempts to monitor and filter the content 
of its users.45 This includes “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to re-
                                                                                                                           
exorbitant monitoring costs. See id. at 139–41 (noting that imposing liability would impede the free 
flow of information at a low cost, a major benefit of online communications). 
 38 Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5. 
 39 See id. at *1. 
 40 Id. at *2. 
 41 See id. at *5. 
 42 See id.; see also Shiamilli, 952 N.E.2d at 1016; Joshua Dubnow, Note, Ensuring Innovation as 
the Internet Matures: Competing Interpretations of the Intellectual Property Exception to the Com-
munications Decency Act Immunity, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 297, 299 (2010) (noting that 
imposing liability upon good faith efforts to monitor has the potential to chill both laudatory business 
decisions and user speech on the Internet). 
 43 See 47 U.S.C. § 230; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (noting that Congress passed section 230 of the 
CDA to correct the disincentives to monitoring); Shiamilli, 952 N.E.2d at 1016 (explaining the per-
verse incentives that Stratton Oakmont created and Congress’s response); Schruers, supra note 37, at 
211–13. Congress made a bargain with interactive service providers to provide a broad immunity for 
third-party content in exchange for strict limits on speech related to child indecency content and por-
nography. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting the agreement be-
tween Congress and service providers); PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLI-
CY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 426 (Thomson Reuters, ed., 4th ed. 2010) (ex-
plaining the congressional objectives to provide broad third-party immunity while imposing strict 
limits on child indecency content); Mary Kay Finn et al., Policies Underlying Congressional Approval 
of Criminal and Civil Immunity for Interactive Computer Service Providers Under Provisions of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996—Should E-Buyers Beware?, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 347, 354–55 
(2000) (describing the debate in Congress leading up to the enactment of the CDA). 
 44 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”). 
 45 Id. CDA immunity is not confined to defamation claims; rather, the immunity also applies to 
all civil claims. See, e.g., Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 38, 41–42 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) 
(interpreting the applicability of the CDA to contract claims). The CDA also provides explicit excep-
tions as to criminal and intellectual property law. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)–(2). 
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strict access to or availability of” objectionable material.46 Section 230 of the 
CDA does not encourage websites to monitor, but simply removes the legal 
downside of monitoring.47 
Section 230 of the CDA distinguishes between “interactive computer ser-
vices” and “information content providers,” providing civil liability immunity 
to computer services, but not to information providers.48 An interactive com-
puter service means any host that enables computer access by multiple users to 
a computer server, like a website.49 The term “interactive computer service” 
also incorporates the term “access software providers,” which includes any 
website that offers functions that “filter, screen, allow, or disallow content . . . 
pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or transmit, receive, display, forward, 
cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content.”50 On the other 
hand, an “information content provider” is any person or entity that is “respon-
sible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information.”51 
The focus of litigation involving section 230 of the CDA is when an in-
teractive computer service is simultaneously an information content provider, 
thus causing it to lose the immunity that the CDA provides.52 Although it is 
clear when a website engages in the “creation” of information, defining what 
constitutes a website’s “development” of information has been far more diffi-
cult.53 
Congress explained its findings and the policy reasons behind the CDA in 
the statutory text.54 Congress intended to preserve the Internet as a robust me-
dium for communication and to remove the disincentives for hosts to self-
                                                                                                                           
 46 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B). 
 47 See id. § 230(b)(4), (c)(2)(B); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163 (“In other words, Congress 
sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content, not the creation of content . . . .”); Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 331 (explaining that in response to Stratton Oakmont, the CDA removes the disincentives 
to monitoring). 
 48 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f)(2)–(3). 
 49 Id. § 230(f)(2). 
 50 Id. § 230(f)(4). 
 51 Id. § 230(f)(3). Litigants argue that although a website is an interactive computer service, it is 
also an information content provider when it contributes to the information in part, thus losing CDA 
immunity. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165–66. 
 52 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165–66; Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 
1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining the relationship between interactive computer services and infor-
mation content providers); Doty, supra note 16, at 128 (describing the application of CDA immunity); 
Weslander, supra note 16, at 279. 
 53 See Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“While an 
overt act of creation of content is easy to identify, determining what makes a party responsible for the 
‘development’ of content under § 230(f)(3) is unclear.”); Shiamilli, 952 N.E.2d at 1017 (stating “no 
consensus has emerged concerning what conduct constitutes ‘development’”). 
 54 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b). Specifically, the Act has two goals: “to promote the free exchange of 
information and ideas over the Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or ob-
scene material.” Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122. The CDA has also been interpreted to specially overrule 
Stratton Oakmont. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; see Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5. 
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regulate.55 Congress chose to promote the development of the Internet by re-
moving the potential for a host to be liable for the content of its users.56 At the 
motion to dismiss stage, websites can seek CDA immunity from civil liability, 
preventing expensive discovery costs.57 Originally applied predominantly to 
defamation cases, CDA immunity has been interpreted to apply to any civil 
suit claiming vicarious liability for websites.58 
B. Ambiguity from Adjudication: The Roommates.com Definition of 
“Development of Information” and the Resulting Uncertainty as to  
When a Website Is Also an “Information Content Provider” 
This section discusses the seminal case law that resulted from the enact-
ment of section 230 of the CDA.59 It first explains the initial response of courts 
to provide broad immunity to websites, followed by a major holding that limits 
this immunity.60 This section then explains two approaches that courts have 
taken in determining when an interactive computer service loses immunity.61 
1. Initial Attempts at Interpreting “Development of Information” and the 
Roommates.com “Material Contribution” Test 
Recognizing Congress’s intent and explicit policy towards website im-
munity, most courts initially interpreted “information content provider” very 
narrowly, making it hard to find a website contributorily liable for its users’ 
content.62 Some courts held that websites profiting from illegal content could 
                                                                                                                           
 55 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31. 
 56 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); Carafano, 339 F.3d 1122–23; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
 57 Andrew Bluebond, When the Customer Is Wrong: Defamation, Interactive Websites, and Im-
munity, 33 REV. LITIG. 679, 689–90 (2014) (explaining that CDA immunity provides grounds for a 
motion to dismiss, a time at which there has been little opportunity for pertinent facts to be discov-
ered). 
 58 See Schneider, 31 P.3d at 41–42 (holding that the CDA extends beyond defamation to any civil 
claim besides the exceptions enumerated in the statutory text); Zac Locke, Comment, Asking for It: A 
Grokster-Based Approach to Internet Sites That Distribute Offensive Content, 18 SETON HALL J. 
SPORTS & ENT. L. 151, 159 (2008) (noting the expansion of CDA applicability beyond defamation 
law). The CDA, however, does not provide immunity from criminal and intellectual property claims. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)–(2). 
 59 See infra notes 59–109 and accompanying text. 
 60 See infra notes 62–83 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra notes 84–109 and accompanying text. 
 62 See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (explaining that CDA immunity has been applied broadly). In 
1997, in Zeran v. American Online, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that 
America Online (“AOL”) was not the information content provider of alleged defamatory comments 
on an AOL bulletin board and thus immune from liability for the comments. 129 F.3d at 332–34. An 
unidentified user posted insensitive t-shirts for sale relating to the Oklahoma City bombing, with Ze-
ran’s information as the point of contact as a prank. See id. at 329. Zeran contacted AOL, who agreed 
to take the post down but would not post a retraction. See id. After AOL took down the information, it 
was immediately reposted, snowballing into harassment, death threats, and public humiliation for 
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still receive CDA immunity.63 Courts also rejected assigning liability even if a 
website received notice of alleged defamation because it would impose moni-
toring costs and burden websites, contrary to Congress’s intent.64 These courts 
took a hardline approach in protecting CDA immunity, noting that Congress 
chose to immunize an “active, even aggressive” role for interactive computer 
services.65 
In contrast to these broad views of CDA immunity, other courts applied a 
strict textual interpretation of the language “responsible . . . in part, for the . . . 
development” of the information and thereby limited CDA immunity.66 In 
2008, in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 
LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Room-
mates.com was not immune from liability under the CDA.67 Roommates.com 
connected people looking for roommates with those seeking vacancies.68 Users 
were required to fill out a questionnaire asking their preferences as to a room-
mate’s sex, sexual orientation, and renting to those with children.69 Room-
mates.com then displayed these preferences and comments in the form of a 
user’s profile page and provided a search function based on these prefer-
ences.70 Plaintiffs sued Roommates.com for violating the Fair Housing Act 
                                                                                                                           
Zeran. See id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that by removing content, AOL performed a traditional 
publisher function, now protected under the CDA. See id. at 332–34 
 63 Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 51–52; Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 557. Courts also held that a website’s 
knowledge of illegal content did not foreclose CDA immunity. See Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 51–52; 
Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 557. 
 64 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (noting that if an interactive computer service provider is dealt with 
a multitude of take-down notices, it will simply remove the content in question without examining the 
legality of the content because there is no liability for removing content, and in doing so will avoid 
monitoring costs). Requiring websites to monitor its users’ content stifles the free flow of information. 
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. 
 65 Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 51–52 (“If it were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree with 
plaintiffs. . . . But Congress has made a different policy choice by providing immunity even where the 
interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared 
by others.”). In 1998, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
held AOL immune from the defamatory comments written by Matthew Drudge on a popular gossip 
website called the “Drudge Report.” Id. at 50–52. Drudge licensed the “Drudge Report” to AOL for 
$3000 per month. See id. at 51. Under the agreement, Drudge e-mailed AOL his articles, which AOL 
subsequently posted. See id. at 47. AOL reserved the right to remove and request changes to certain 
content that it deemed necessary. See id. AOL also advertised the availability of the Drudge Report as 
a draw for customers to sign up with AOL. See id. at 51. 
 66 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–69 (interpreting “development” to 
mean “materially contributing” to the alleged unlawfulness of the information). 
 67 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168–69, 75; Doty, supra note 16, at 129–31. The point at 
which an interactive computer service also becomes an information content provider is the point at 
which the service loses immunity under the CDA. See Doty, supra note 16, at 127–28 (explaining the 
applicability of the CDA); Weslander supra note 16, at 279. 
 68 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1161. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 1161–62, 67. 
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(“FHA”), which makes it illegal to rent housing or refuse to rent housing on 
the basis of race, gender, and familial status.71 The Ninth Circuit held that 
Roommates.com could be liable for its display of user preferences and their 
use of a search function based on those preferences because these actions con-
stituted “development,” in part, of information.72 
The Ninth Circuit announced a test for determining when an interactive 
computer service is also an information content provider, interpreting “devel-
opment” of information to mean “materially contributing to its unlawful-
ness.”73 In adopting this test, the court looked towards Wikipedia for the defi-
nition of “web development,” which included “gathering, organizing and edit-
ing information” in its definition.74  
The dissent criticized the majority for formulating a test related to the un-
derlying claim of illegality because the issue of illegality is decided only after 
a website is deemed to be an information content provider.75 The dissent ar-
gued that immunity should be determined by the degree to which the website 
contributed to the information, regardless of whether the information itself is 
illegal.76  
Moreover, the dissent expressed frustration with the majority’s incon-
sistent and ambiguous language in its test for determining whether a website 
“materially contributed to the alleged unlawfulness” of the content.77 The dis-
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. at 1162. The Fair Housing Act prohibits discriminatory or preferential rentals, or sales 
based on protected categories. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012). 
 72 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1166–67, 1175. The Ninth Circuit also held that Roommates.com 
could be liable for the questions it poses because it is providing that information. Id. at 1164. Room-
mates.com also provided a comments box for users to write additional information. Id. at 1161. The 
Ninth Circuit held that Roommates.com is immune from liability for the additional comments section 
because it merely provided an open space for users. Id. at 1173–74. At this stage the Court only dis-
carded CDA immunity, remanding for further consideration as to whether the content violated the 
FHA. Id. at 1175. 
 73 Id. at 1167–68 (interpreting development to mean “materially contributing to its alleged unlaw-
fulness,” such as contributing to the defamation); see Doty, supra note 16, at 129–31 (explaining the 
requirement test as a “solicitation” standard and the encouragement test as an “inducement” standard); 
Dyer supra note 16, at 845–46. 
 74 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168–69. The functions of gathering, organizing, and editing 
information are similar to the traditional publisher duties protected by the CDA. See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1180 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (opining that the majority’s 
definition of “web development” includes terms explicitly protected under the statute); see also Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 330 (stating that claims that attempt to hold websites liable for traditional publisher func-
tions are meritless). 
 75 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting that there is no 
reference to unlawfulness in the text of the CDA and thus the majority is conflating an issue of im-
munity with an issue of substantive liability). 
 76 See id. (noting that websites could be information content providers of harmless information, 
and the determination of illegality is made after the CDA analysis). 
 77 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175 (stating that a website loses immunity for encouraging 
or requiring illegal content). In Judge McKeown’s dissent he criticizes the majority for leaving web-
sites “wondering where immunity ends and liability begins.” Id. at 1176–77 (McKeown, J., dissent-
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sent observed how although the majority seemed to emphasize that Room-
mates.com required users to answer unlawful questions as a condition of ser-
vice, throughout the opinion, the majority substituted “requirement” for words 
like “collaborate,” “force,” “design,” “induce,” “encourage,” “elicit” and 
“urge.”78 To the dissent, the majority was ironically at its most ambiguous 
when it attempted to be the most clear, for the majority opinion stated: “the 
message to website operators is clear: if you don’t encourage illegal content, 
or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be 
immune.”79 
The Ninth Circuit’s expansive definition of “information content provid-
er” was novel, for a website’s design could now make a company responsible 
in part for the development of its users’ content.80 Most courts have accepted 
the Roommates.com “material contribution” test for determining when a web-
site “develops” information “in part.”81 Some have criticized the decision, 
however, arguing that it conflicts with Congress’s broad grant of immunity.82 
Moreover, when determining CDA immunity under this framework, it is un-
clear whether encouragement or requirement is the standard.83 
2. Different Standards for Determining Immunity Under Section 230 of the 
CDA: The Encouragement Test and the Requirement Test 
Under the umbrella of the “materially contributing to its unlawfulness” 
test from Roommates.com, courts have adopted two different approaches to 
                                                                                                                           
ing). The majority stated that by “requiring” answers to its questions it loses CDA immunity as to that 
information. See id. at 1165 (majority opinion). The majority then uses words like “urge” and “en-
courage” to describe when the website loses immunity. See id. at 1173–74 (finding Roommates.com 
immune for the open-ended writing space of its users); Doty, supra note 16, at 130–31 (explaining the 
vagueness of the majority’s holding in Roommates.com); Weslander, supra note 16, at 269. 
 78 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167, 1172–73; Doty, supra note 16, at 130–31; Weslander, 
supra note 16, at 269. Additionally, the majority emphasizes that Roommates.com “makes aggressive 
use” of the content in conducting its business. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172. 
 79 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175 (emphasis added). In Judge McKeown’s dissenting 
opinion he emphasized that websites are “left scratching their heads and wondering where immunity 
ends and liability begins.” See id. at 1176 (McKeown, J., dissenting). 
 80 See Doty, supra note 16, at 129–31 (explaining the Roommates.com test and various approach-
es courts have taken since the decision); Dyer supra note 16, at 845–46. 
 81 See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 412 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting 
the Roommates.com test has been widely adopted); Doty, supra note 16, at 126–31 (explaining the 
different routes courts have gone in interpreting the Roommates.com test); Dyer supra note 16, at 
845–46. 
 82 Doty, supra note 16, at 126–27, 130–31, 136 (“Some language suggests that a Web site loses 
immunity by simply encouraging an illegal aspect of its user-generated content.” (footnote omitted)); 
Dyer supra note 16, at 845–46. Apart from the outliers, a large majority of courts applying the CDA 
have granted immunity. Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 558 (noting only a “handful” of three-hundred reported 
decisions in federal and state courts have not granted immunity). 
 83 See 521 F.3d at 1176–77 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s opinion as a 
slippery slope); Dyer, supra note 16, at 844. 
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determining when a website materially contributes to the information in ques-
tion.84 Some courts have held that if a website encourages users to produce 
illegal content, then it materially contributes to the illegal act, whereas other 
courts have applied a heightened standard that a website must require the in-
formation at issue in order to be held liable for its illegality.85 
Under the encouragement test, a website that encourages or induces ille-
gal content, rather than employs “neutral tools,” is considered a developer, in 
part, of that content.86 Thus, if the website specifically encourages allegedly 
unlawful content, it is deemed an information content provider and loses im-
munity under § 230.87 In 2009, in FTC v. Accusearch Inc., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted this interpretation of the material contri-
bution test.88 There, the FTC brought an unfair trade practice claim against Ac-
cusearch, Inc. for selling confidential phone records.89 Accusearch paid re-
searchers to collect personal phone record information and advertised access to 
these confidential records.90 The Tenth Circuit held that because Accusearch 
specifically encouraged requests for protected information and paid research-
ers to obtain the information, it materially contributed to the unlawfulness of 
that information and was therefore liable for it.91 
Under the encouragement test, a website will be responsible for the de-
velopment of information if it has an “active role” and instructs users to post 
certain content.92 In 2004, in MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, the 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See Shiamilli, 952 N.E.2d at 1017 (stating “no consensus has emerged concerning what con-
duct constitutes ‘development’”); Doty, supra note 16, at 126–27, 130–31, 136; Dyer, supra note 16, 
at 845–46. 
 85 See Doty, supra note 16, at 126–27, 130–31, 136 (explaining the requirement test as a “solicita-
tion” standard and the encouragement test as an “inducement” standard); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–
46. The holding in Roommates.com leaves open the possibility for two different interpretations. See 
521 F.3d at 1175 (“The message to website operators is clear: if you don’t encourage illegal content, 
or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be immune.”); Doty, supra 
note 16, at 126–27, 130–31, 136 (noting that the Roommates.com majority used different terms and 
descriptors in describing the conduct); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46. 
 86 See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining the use of 
neutral tools); Massachusetts ex rel. P.K. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 
1041, 1051 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (quoting Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199) (explaining that a website is 
liable for its users’ content when it specifically encourages the content); MCW, Inc. v. Badbusiness-
bureau.com, LLC, No. 3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL 833595, at *8–10 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004) (in-
terpreting development to mean “active role”); Doty, supra note 16, at 126, 130–31, 136. Tools are 
neutral “so long as users ultimately decide what content to post, such that the tool merely provides ‘a 
framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes.’” Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 
F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1997–98 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172). 
 87 Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 1190. 
 90 Id. at 1191–92, 1201. 
 91 Id. at 1200–01 (noting that Accusearch went further when it “affirmatively solicited” the con-
tent). 
 92 MCW, 2004 WL 833595, at *8. 
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U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that Badbusinesss-
bureau.com was liable for the allegedly defamatory statements of its users.93 
Badbusinessbureau.com hosted a consumer complaint forum that enabled cus-
tomers to get revenge for unsatisfactory experiences through public web-posts 
and class action lawsuits.94 Additionally, an operator of Badbusinessbu-
reau.com emailed users, directing them to gather photos and collect detailed 
information.95 This encouragement was enough for the district court to hold 
that Badbusinessbureau.com was a developer of the content and thus not im-
mune under the CDA.96 
Other courts have held that encouragement is not enough to find that a 
website operator materially contributed to the alleged unlawfulness of infor-
mation and is thus responsible for the development of it.97 These courts nar-
rowly interpret the Roommates.com “materially contributing to its unlawful-
ness” test, emphasizing that the requirement of the questionnaire as a condition 
of service was essential to that holding.98 Compared to the encouragement test, 
the requirement test is more likely to lead to immunity under section 230 of the 
CDA.99 These courts rely heavily on Congress’s explicit policy choice in sec-
tion 230 of the CDA to provide robust immunity to websites, regardless of eth-
ical considerations.100 
Under this test, a website will lose its CDA immunity and be responsible 
for allegedly illegal content only if it requires users to post that content.101 In 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Id. at *10. Although decided before the Roommates.com case, the court’s interpretation in 
Badbusinessbureau.com is an example of the encouragement test, focusing on the website’s influence 
of third-party content. See id. at *8; Doty, supra note 16, at 141 (characterizing this test as an “in-
ducement” standard); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46. 
 94 MCW, 2004 WL 833595, at *1–2. 
 95 Id. at *10. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–16 (discarding the encouragement test); Carafano, 339 F.3d 
at 1123 (holding that a website is immune so long as the third party willingly provides the content); 
Ascentive, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (holding that encouragement is not enough to make a website liable 
as an information content provider); Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 
F. Supp. 2d 929, 931–33 (D. Ariz. 2008); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 554 (holding that a website must control 
or ensure the creation of the content to lose immunity). 
 98 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 416 (finding for immunity for the website); Roommates.com, 521 
F.3d at 1167–69 (interpreting “development” to mean “materially contributing” to the alleged unlaw-
fulness of the information); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 (holding in favor of CDA immunity); God-
dard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1998 (finding no “control” or “collaboration” on behalf of Google). 
 99 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (explaining that under an encouragement test, websites 
would lose immunity easily, conflicting with the CDA). 
 100 See id.; Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (explaining Congress’s intent in enacting the CDA); As-
centive, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (quoting Global Royalties, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 933). 
 101 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–17. Imposing liability only when a website requires content 
is based on a narrow interpretation of the holding in Roommates.com, focusing on the requirement 
aspect as key to the Ninth Circuit’s holding. See id. at 416. Other courts discard immunity only when 
the website changes the nature of the content. See Ascentive, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (citing Global 
Royalties, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 933). In such cases, the court will look to the “totality of the circum-
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2014, in Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that encouragement is not enough to make a 
website an information content provider.102 TheDirty.Com enabled users to post 
gossip-related content by asking them to provide the “who, what, when, where, 
why.”103 The website operator then added one line of his own commentary to 
supplement the user’s post.104 In holding TheDirty.Com immune from a defa-
mation suit, the Sixth Circuit noted that the tools provided were neutral and did 
not require users to publish illegal content.105 Further, the Sixth Circuit held 
that even the website’s additional commentary did not materially contribute to 
the alleged unlawfulness because it was published after the user’s original de-
famatory statements.106 
Opting for broad CDA immunity is met by critics, who argue the CDA 
goes too far in protecting those who harbor others violating the law.107 They 
                                                                                                                           
stances.” See id. at 474. Another court has said the website must “control” or “ensure the creation of” 
unlawful content. See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 554. 
 102 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–17. 
 103 Id. at 402–03. 
 104 Id. at 403. 
 105 Id. at 415–17. 
 106 Id. Despite this court’s holding, the CDA is clear that websites are information content provid-
ers with respect to the content it directly writes, like the questions in Roommates.com. See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230 (a)–(c); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164. But the fact that the plaintiff did not allege the web-
site’s own comments to be defamatory may have been the deciding factor. See Dirty World, 755 F.3d 
at 416. Under the requirement test, if a website does not require illegal content, it will be immune 
from third-party liability as long as the user ultimately provides the content in question. See Room-
mates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171, 1175 (clarifying the holding in Carafano); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 
(holding the website immune “so long as the third party willingly provides the essential published 
content”). Many courts have explicitly followed the Carafano court’s test. See, e.g., Ascentive, 842 
F. Supp. 2d at 474; Goddard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1198; Global Royalties, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 933. In 
2003, in Carafano v. Metrospalsh.com, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
an online dating website’s questionnaire and display of profile did not make it an information content 
provider. 339 F.3d at 1124–25. The plaintiff attempted to hold the dating website liable for another 
user’s fake profile of the plaintiff, a famous actress. Id. at 1121–22. Unlike in Roommates.com, the 
dating website’s questionnaire did not require illegal content; rather, the user ultimately provided the 
illegal content. Compare Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169 (requiring content that violated the Fair 
Housing Act), with Carafano, 339 F.3d 1123–26 (requiring general information, to which the user 
entered defamatory statements). See Goddard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1197–98 (explaining that tools are 
neutral “so long as users ultimately decide what content to post, such that the tool merely provides ‘a 
framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes’” (quoting Roommates.com, 521 
F.3d at 1172)). Although both Roommates.com and Carafano dealt with websites that contained ques-
tionnaires and displays of preferences, the Ninth Circuit in Carafano ruled for a broad grant of im-
munity. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171–72 (clarifying the holding in Carafano); Carafano, 
339 F.3d at 1125. 
 107 See Mary Anne Franks, The Lawless Internet Myths and Misconceptions About CDA Section 
230, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-anne-franks/section-
230-the-lawless-internet_b_4455090.html [perma.cc/W82P-TQ86] (arguing the CDA should not be a 
protection for online abuse); Brett Logiurato, This Is the One Law Airbnb’s Opponents Desperately 
Want to Change, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-illegal-law-
case-2014-4 [perma.cc/7X34-BEBX] (noting how Airbnb relies on CDA immunity to run its e-
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propose that stricter limitations on retaining CDA immunity will provide fairer 
legal remedies for victims of cyber harassment and revenge pornography, 
among other civil violations.108 Some alternate tests include accepting an en-
couragement or inducement standard for determining contributory liability, or 
demanding the content to be removed upon request.109 
C. Modern Marketplaces: StubHub and Its Reliance on the CDA 
Capturing the inefficiency of supply and demand pricing on the primary 
ticket market, StubHub allows consumers to buy or resell tickets on the sec-
ondary market.110 For a sold-out event, a customer can go to the secondary 
market and pay a premium price over face value.111 Conversely, for an event in 
which the primary vendor’s price exceeds demand, a lower price can be found 
on the secondary market.112 
StubHub provides an easy interface for sellers to list tickets to an event.113 
The service allows sellers to upload tickets and input detailed information re-
garding the quantity, section, row, seat number, and various other features or 
                                                                                                                           
commerce service). The concerns are primarily ones of privacy and harassment, but extend to any civil 
claim. See Bluebond, supra note 57, at 689–90 (arguing for a “specific encouragement” standard for 
CDA immunity); Locke, supra note 58, at 159 (arguing for a Grokster “inducement” approach, similar to 
the court in NPS); Andrew Bolson, The Internet Has Grown Up, Why Hasn’t the Law? Reexamining 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, PRIVACY ADVISOR (Aug. 27, 2013), https://
privacyassociation.org/news/a/the-internet-has-grown-up-why-hasnt-the-law-reexamining-section-230-
of-the/ [perma.cc/N6AV-HHJA] (arguing that the CDA is a threat to online privacy); Joe Mullin, 
Revenge Porn Is “Just Entertainment,” Says Owner of IsAnybodyDown, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 4, 
2013, 9:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/02/revenge-porn-is-just-entertainment-says-
owner-of-isanybodydown/ [perma.cc/A86G-AVVU] (noting the over-protective tendencies of the 
CDA). 
 108 See Bluebond, supra note 57, at 689–90; Locke, supra note 58, at 159 (calling for a stricter 
standard when applying CDA immunity); Logiurato, supra note 107 (detailing New York’s struggle 
to regulate Airbnb because of the protection that the CDA provides); Bolson, supra note 107 (arguing 
that changes are needed to the CDA because the Internet has grown in ways Congress did not original-
ly foresee). 
 109 Bluebond, supra note 57, at 689–90 (arguing for a “specific encouragement” standard for 
CDA immunity); Locke supra note 58, at 159 (arguing for an inducement standard); Bolson, supra 
note 107 (arguing for a notice and take-down process). 
 110 See Rovell, supra note 6; Cassidy, supra note 6 (explaining how StubHub works). 
 111 See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 479 (discussing how the majority of New England Patriots tick-
ets sold on StubHub are in excess of their face value); Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26. 
 112 See Rubin, supra note 12 (finding StubHub prices to be cheaper on average than tickets on the 
primary market for New York Mets tickets); Sloane, supra note 12 (noting the availability of Yankees 
tickets on StubHub below face value); Brad Tuttle, Does Anybody Pay Face Value for Sports Tickets 
Nowadays?, TIME (June 12, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/06/12/does-anybody-pay-face-value-
for-sports-tickets-nowadays/ [perma.cc/PD73-398U]. 
 113 See Seller FAQ, STUBHUB, https://sell.stubhub.com/sfr/sell/faqView [https://perma.cc/Z5WM
-PXH8]; see also Cassidy, supra note 6. 
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disclosures.114 StubHub’s seller interface provides data for how much other 
tickets are selling for in a section, including the lowest, median, and highest 
prices.115 StubHub also conducts a “LargeSellers” program where it offers fee 
discounts for high-volume sellers.116 The LargeSellers program also gives the 
high-volume sellers an exclusive opportunity to buy underpriced tickets, and a 
chance to resell them at a higher price.117 
In its user agreement, StubHub makes it clear that it does not own or con-
trol user data.118 The agreement places the responsibility of listing tickets on 
the seller and requires any listing to be in accordance with the law.119 Accord-
ing to the agreement, the user owns any content submitted, granting StubHub 
the right to use it freely.120 
Although originally applied to defamation suits, CDA immunity applies 
to all civil liability.121 Faced with anti-scalping law claims and business torts, 
StubHub and other peer-to-peer online marketplaces depend on § 230 immuni-
ty to shield their business models from liability.122 In the absence of § 230, 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See Seller FAQ, supra note 113; see also Cassidy, supra note 6. The features or disclosures 
allow the user to indicate if the seat is an aisle, handicap accessible, or with an obstructed view. See 
Cassidy, supra note 6. 
 115 See Cassidy, supra note 6. These statistics will often produce prices that are above face value. 
See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 480; Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26; Rovell, supra note 6 (discussing 
dynamic pricing). 
 116 See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 480, 485. StubHub also provides an online payment method, 
and discloses the fees it retains. See id. at 480; Cassidy, supra note 6. 
 117 See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 480, 485. 
 118 See id. at 484 (discrediting StubHub user agreement); see also Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (up-
holding StubHub user agreement). See generally User Agreement, STUBHUB (last updated June 1, 
2015), http://www.stubhub.com/user_agreement/ [https://perma.cc/D2GF-MC2G]. StubHub opens its 
user agreement by stating “because sellers set ticket prices, they may be higher than face value.” User 
Agreement, supra. 
 119 See User Agreement, supra note 118. 
 120 See id. In 2013, StubHub added an arbitration clause, which users can opt-out from by giving 
notice within thirty days of their initial use. Chris Morran, Now You Can No Longer File Class-Action 
Suits Against StubHub; Here’s How to Opt Out, CONSUMERIST (Feb. 22, 2013), http://consumerist.
com/2013/02/22/now-you-can-no-longer-file-class-action-suits-against-stubhub-heres-how-to-opt-out/ 
[perma.cc/BGS3-ANHJ]. See generally User Agreement, supra note 118. 
 121 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), (e)(3) (stating that CDA immunity applies to all civil liability and is 
not limited to tort claims); Schneider, 31 P.3d at 41–42 (holding that the CDA extends beyond defa-
mation to any civil claim besides the exceptions enumerated in the statutory text). 
 122 See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 485 (defending a claim for tortious interference with advanta-
geous relations based on liability for a seller’s violation of anti-scalping law while using the website); 
see also Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 553 (defending a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices based on 
liability for a seller’s violation of anti-scalping law while using the website). Although the practice of 
ticket scalping, especially online, is trending largely towards deregulation, there are still state laws in 
place that prohibit the resale of tickets above face value. See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26. Massa-
chusetts legislators are proposing bills to repeal their anti-scalping laws. See Lewontin, supra note 13 
(noting that repealing current anti-scalping law would harmonize the law with the current state of the 
secondary ticket market). 
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marketplaces would likely face endless claims attempting to hold them liable 
for their users’ peer-to-peer communications.123 
II. SOLD OUT: CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF CDA IMMUNITY 
THREATEN THE INNOVATION OF STUBHUB AND  
PEER-TO-PEER MARKETPLACES 
Diverging court opinions on whether the CDA grants StubHub immunity 
creates uncertainty as to the legality of StubHub’s practices and potentially 
chills innovation.124 Section A of this Part discusses the diverging opinions in 
the 2012 Court of Appeals of North Carolina decision in Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 
and in the 2009 Superior Court of Massachusetts decision in NPS v. StubHub, 
Inc.125 Section B of this Part analyzes the conflicting decisions, focusing on 
knowledge and willful blindness.126 Section C of this Part discusses how this 
uncertainty affects the business practices of StubHub and other peer-to-peer 
marketplaces going forward.127 
A. The StubHub Split: Conflicting Applications of the CDA Cause 
Uncertainty About Immunity for StubHub 
StubHub’s first attempt at claiming immunity under the CDA was excep-
tionally disastrous.128 In 2009, in NPS v. StubHub, Inc., a Superior Court of 
Massachusetts held that StubHub was not immune under the CDA for a tor-
tious interference claim.129 The New England Patriots sought an injunction 
against StubHub enjoining resale of Patriots tickets on StubHub’s website.130 
The Patriots alleged that StubHub interfered with their agreement with season 
ticket holders, which included a non-transferability clause.131 To show that 
StubHub interfered with its agreement by “improper means,” a necessary ele-
                                                                                                                           
 123 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171–72 (noting that, in close cases, websites should be 
granted immunity in line with Congress’s intent, or else websites will face “death by ten thousand 
duck-bites”); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 553 (defending a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices based 
on liability for a seller’s violation of anti-scalping law while using the website). 
 124 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1176 (9th Cir. 2008) (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting that websites are “left scratching their heads 
and wondering where immunity ends and liability begins”); Eric Goldman, Eric’s Blog, 16 No. 5 
CYBERSPACE LAW. 20 (2011) (explaining that all marketplaces attempt to drive the market to equilib-
rium prices, and if this is viewed as “encouraging” content, all marketplaces are at risk); Doty, supra 
note 16, at 126 (describing StubHub’s lack of immunity under the CDA). 
 125 See infra notes 128–144 and accompanying text. 
 126 See infra notes 145–159 and accompanying text. 
 127 See infra notes 160–170 and accompanying text. 
 128 See NPS, LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 25 Mass. L. Rptr. 478, 485–86 (Super. Ct. 2009) (holding 
StubHub liable under the CDA for its “knowing participation” in its users’ ticket scalping). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 478–79. 
 131 Id. at 478–80. 
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ment of a tortious interference claim, the Patriots claimed StubHub contributed 
to their users’ violation of anti-scalping law.132 
Adopting a variation of the encouragement test, the Superior Court of 
Massachusetts in NPS held that StubHub materially contributed to ticket scalp-
ing because it induced others to violate the law.133 In denying summary judg-
ment, the court discussed how StubHub’s pricing structure indicated it profited 
from above face value tickets and failed to disclose the face value of tickets.134 
StubHub’s handbook encouraged “LargeSellers” to buy underpriced tickets, 
implying they could resell them for a higher price.135 In addition, StubHub 
provided the option for LargeSellers to “mask” their exact ticket location, mak-
ing it hard for the Patriots to determine which season ticket holders are selling 
on StubHub.136 According to the court, this inducement or “knowing participa-
tion” amounted to material contribution towards illegal ticket-scalping, enough 
to lose immunity under the test announced in 2008, in Fair Housing Council of 
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit.137 
In contrast, in 2012, in Hill v. StubHub, Inc., the Court of Appeals of 
North Carolina held that StubHub was immune from similar anti-scalping law 
violations under the CDA.138 In that case, a buyer used StubHub to purchase 
Hannah Montana concert tickets that exceeded the face value price by roughly 
three times.139 The buyer then brought suit alleging that StubHub was respon-
sible for the development of the ticket price, violating North Carolina’s anti-
scalping law.140 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Id. at 485. Massachusetts scalping law prohibits the reselling of tickets at more than two dol-
lars above face value, not including reasonable service fees. Id. at 479. 
 133 See id. at 483, 485. The court perhaps went even further in holding that liability could be 
shown for profiting from illegal conduct while “declining to stop or limit it.” See id. at 483 (citing 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)); see also City of 
Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the CDA does not create 
immunity at all, but just determines who is a publisher or not), certifying questions to 979 N.E.2d 844 
(2011). 
 134 See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 483.Because StubHub is not the seller of the tickets itself, it is 
not subject to anti-scalping laws. See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26 (noting that the Massachusetts 
scalping statute only applies to ticket resellers). See generally User Agreement, supra note 118 (ex-
plaining that StubHub is not a seller of tickets, but it simply a marketplace for sellers). 
 135 See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 480, 483. “LargeSellers” is a category of high-volume sellers to 
which StubHub grants special benefits. See id. 
 136 See id. at 480, 482. 
 137 See id. at 485. The Patriots wanted the names of the season ticket holders to see who violated 
their contract. See Bruce Mohl, Patriots Get StubHub Users’ Names, BOSTON.COM (Oct. 19, 2007), 
http://www.boston.com/sports/football/patriots/articles/2007/10/19/patriots_get_stubhub_users_names/ 
[perma.cc/U7X8-RF4M]. 
 138 Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 552 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (upholding CDA immunity 
for StubHub). 
 139 Id. at 552–53. 
 140 Id. at 554. 
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Adopting the heightened standard that encouragement of illegal content is 
not enough to lose immunity, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that 
a website must “effectively control” the content or “ensure the creation” of it 
to be liable.141 Explicitly declining to follow the test set forth in NPS, the court 
interpreted the CDA and relevant case law to provide a broad grant of immuni-
ty.142 Faced with similar facts as in NPS, the court held that encouragement or 
inducement of market-based prices above face value does not constitute devel-
opment of actual price information.143 Also, unlike the court in NPS, the court 
held that knowledge of illegal content does not automatically remove a web-
site’s CDA immunity.144 
B. Determining StubHub’s CDA Immunity Based on Knowledge of, or 
Willful Blindness Towards, Ticket-Scalping 
A major difference in the holdings in NPS and Hill is the importance of 
knowledge as a factor for determining a website’s CDA immunity.145 In NPS, 
the Superior Court of Massachusetts considered StubHub’s increased profit 
from above face value ticket prices and fee waivers for LargeSellers to resell 
underpriced tickets at a higher price.146 According to the court, StubHub know-
ingly induced illegal conduct.147 The court held that knowledge or willful 
blindness of illegal conduct constitutes “materially contributing to its unlaw-
fulness.”148 Directly counter to the holding in NPS, the court in Hill held that 
StubHub is not an information content provider and retains immunity even if it 
knows of unlawful conduct by its users.149 
Factual differences in NPS and Hill may have led the NPS court to put 
more weight on StubHub’s knowledge as a factor for immunity.150 In Hill, a 
                                                                                                                           
 141 Id. at 561 (interpreting the material contribution test from Roommates.com, focusing on the 
requirement of users to post unlawful content). 
 142 See id. at 558; see also Milgram v. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 16 A.3d 1113, 1126–27 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010) (declining to follow NPS for similar reasons). 
 143 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 551–54. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina overturned the deci-
sion of the Superior Court of North Carolina, which had held that StubHub’s tools and incentives 
encouraging users to reach market prices constituted the “development” of pricing, making StubHub 
at least willfully blind to the fact that its users’ prices were unlawfully above face value. See Hill v. 
StubHub, Inc., No. 07-CVS-11310, 2011 WL 1675043, at *13 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2011), rev’d, 
727 S.E.2d 550. 
 144 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 559. 
 145 Compare id. at 557 (discarding knowledge as a factor for CDA immunity), with NPS, 25 
Mass. L. Rptr. at 485 (holding StubHub liable under the CDA for its “knowing participation”). 
 146 NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 483. 
 147 Id. at 485. 
 148 See id. at 482, 485 (applying an “inducement” standard, taken from a contributory liability 
analysis for copyright infringement). 
 149 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 560. 
 150 See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 480; see also Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 562. Although in Hill a buyer 
filed suit against his seller and StubHub, in NPS the Patriots filed a larger-scale injunction to limit the 
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one-time buyer filed a complaint against his seller and StubHub.151 In this 
transaction only StubHub’s basic middleman services were in question, includ-
ing its guarantee, fees, and shipping services.152 Conversely, in NPS, the New 
England Patriots sought an injunction against StubHub prohibiting any resale 
of Patriots tickets.153 This larger scale assault on StubHub’s practices detailed 
its incentive program for “LargeSellers” and “masking” tool, limiting the Pa-
triots’ ability to identify season ticket resellers.154 These features painted a pic-
ture of StubHub’s willful blindness towards its users’ conduct.155 
The holding in NPS, that knowledge is sufficient to “materially contrib-
ute” to illegal conduct, is unprecedented.156 Although the opinion in Room-
mates.com may be unclear as to what exactly constitutes “material contribu-
tion” to illegal content, there is no reference to knowledge in the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s holding or dicta.157 In fact, the Superior Court of Massachusetts in NPS 
borrows its knowledge analysis from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision 
in Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, a case that does not involve 
CDA immunity.158 Nonetheless, ambiguity in the Roommates.com decision 
                                                                                                                           
resale of Patriots tickets on StubHub. See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 480; see also Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 
552. 
 151 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 554–55. 
 152 See id. at 562. The facts also involved the StubHub recommended pricing tool, available to all 
sellers. Id. 
 153 NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 478–79. 
 154 See id. at 480. The court held that the masking ability was not sufficient to succeed on a com-
mon law misrepresentation claim because the seller did not mask any information from the buyer, just 
the Patriots. See id. at 482. 
 155 See id. at 482–85 (holding that willful blindness is not compatible with CDA immunity). 
 156 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561; Doty, supra note 16, at 136, 138 (explaining that the ruling in 
NPS was a departure from other interpretations of the material contribution test). The decision in Hill 
is more harmonious with the policy of section 230 of the CDA because Congress enacted the CDA in 
part to remove liability for knowledge of illegal conduct. See Communications Decency Act, 47 
U.S.C. § 230 (a)–(c) (2012); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997); Shiamili v. 
Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (N.Y. 2011); Schruers, supra note 37, at 212–
13. 
 157 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164–70 (not considering knowledge as a factor for immuni-
ty). Liability upon notice or knowledge contradicts the CDA’s purpose. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (de-
scribing the negative effects that notice liability would have on interactive service providers). 
 158 See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930; NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 482–83; Doty, supra note 16, at 137–
38 (noting that the inducement test from Grokster influenced the NPS decision). Even if knowledge is 
relevant for liability, StubHub simply knows the market prices, driven by the forces of supply and 
demand. See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561; Goldman, supra note 124 (explaining that StubHub is simply 
concerned with market price); Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26 (explaining the basic concept of supply 
and demand). Imputing liability from StubHub’s price-dependent revenue model expands liability to 
new levels for CDA jurisprudence and potentially puts e-commerce websites at risk. See NPS, 25 
Mass. L. Rptr. at 482–83 (holding StubHub liable for inducing the price in question); Doty, supra note 
16, at 138–39 (describing the inducement test as a departure from previously narrow rulings). The 
court used the “inducement” standard, taken from contributory liability for copyright infringement in 
the Grokster case. See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 482–83; Doty, supra note 16, at 137–38. But see 
Locke, supra note 58, at 168 (arguing for an “inducement” test derived from Grokster). 
2016] StubHub, Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces, and CDA Immunity 247 
leaves the door open for rogue decisions like NPS and results in uncertainty for 
StubHub.159 
C. CDA Uncertainty Threatens the Growth of StubHub and Other  
Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces 
If StubHub is uncertain as to whether it will receive immunity, it may tai-
lor its practices towards a less interactive experience, stunting growth.160 Con-
gress enacted the CDA, in part, to give websites peace of mind with immuni-
ty.161 As a result of these split decisions, StubHub’s uncertainty as to its im-
munity is tantamount to having no immunity at all.162 In addition, rising legal 
fees for potential liability could stunt growth, contrary to Congress’s goals.163 
The CDA serves as a procedural device at the motion to dismiss stage, allow-
ing websites to stave off discovery costs if granted immunity.164 
Potential liability for facilitating peer-to-peer transactions threatens not 
only StubHub, but all online marketplaces that rely on CDA immunity for in-
novation.165 Companies such as Uber and Airbnb provide ancillary services, 
acting as the middlemen connecting drivers and riders, and homeowners and 
travelers.166 The users of these online marketplaces are increasingly looking for 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1176–77 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (explaining that through 
the majority’s decision almost any function can put a website at risk); Doty, supra note 16, at 130–31. 
 160 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31 (explaining congressional intent to protect the growth of the 
Internet and free speech on the Internet); Brief for Appellant at 19, Hill, 727 S.E.2d 550 (arguing that 
a broad encouragement test would stunt e-commerce growth). 
 161 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (a)–(b) (stating Congress’s findings); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31; Hill, 
727 S.E.2d at 555 (noting the CDA has been interpreted to give websites broad immunity). 
 162 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1176–77 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting websites are 
“left scratching their heads and wondering where immunity ends and liability begins”). If websites are 
unsure if their practices will be protected, they do not receive the peace of mind that comes with cer-
tain immunity. See Goldman, supra note 124 (explaining that the NPS decision could put every mar-
ketplace at risk); Doty, supra note 16, at 138, 141 (describing two standards of interpreting the 
Roommates.com test); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46. 
 163 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (ex-
plaining Congress’s intent in enacting the CDA); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 555 (noting that the CDA has 
been interpreted to give websites broad immunity). 
 164 See Bluebond, supra note 57, at 689–90 (explaining the use of the CDA as a procedural de-
vice). 
 165 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1183 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majori-
ty’s definition puts all websites at risk); Goldman, supra note 124 (describing how under an encour-
agement test, all marketplaces that drive prices to equilibrium supply and demand are at risk); Doty, 
supra note 16, at 138, 141 (explaining the two different approaches courts have taken in interpreting the 
material contribution test); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46; Claire Cian Miller, When Uber and Airbnb 
Meet the Real World, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/upshot/
when-uber-lyft-and-airbnb-meet-the-real-world.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1 [perma.cc/44H3-3L2U] 
(detailing attempts to regulate Uber and Airbnb). 
 166 See Lucas E. Buckley et al., The Intersection of Innovation and the Law: How Crowdfunding 
and the On-Demand Economy Are Changing the Legal Field, WYO. LAW., Aug. 2015, at 36, 38 (ex-
plaining how Uber and Airbnb are disrupting traditional markets through simplification); Molly Co-
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more data-driven and interactive user experiences and are moving away from a 
Craigslist.org white-pages approach.167 But, when courts impose liability on 
these interactive marketplaces, they encourage the services to be more like a 
barebones Craigslist.168 If legal liability outweighs the revenue benefits from 
interactive peer-to-peer tools, the growth of marketplaces like StubHub could 
be halted, depriving consumers of new e-commerce.169 This likely conflicts 
with Congress’s policy to limit government intervention and promote the 
growth of the Internet.170 
III. RESELLING THE CDA: FORMULATING A NEW TEST FOR “INFORMATION 
CONTENT PROVIDERS” AND SECTION 230 IMMUNITY 
This Part articulates a new test for CDA immunity, arguing that websites 
should only lose immunity when they take a clear act guaranteeing the produc-
tion of the content.171 Section A focuses on a textual analysis of the CDA, in-
cluding the findings, policies, and definitions that support a new test.172 Sec-
tion B revisits the “material contribution” test, established in the 2008 U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
hen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing Economy, BOSTON B.J. 
(Apr. 1, 2014), http://bostonbarjournal.com/2014/04/01/whats-old-becomes-new-regulating-the-sharing-
economy/ [perma.cc/7BG7-THUN] (explaining the growth of the sharing economy). 
 167 Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-
economy/ [perma.cc/G7PT-YE4K] (noting the growth with evolution of Airbnb features); Josh Hanna, 
Craigslist Has Been Disrupted, It’s Just Not Obvious Yet, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 3, 2011), http://www.
businessinsider.com/craigslist-has-been-disrupted-its-just-not-obvious-yet-2011-4 [perma.cc/5DDW-
F676] (detailing how Craigslist is losing ground to competitors who offer more innovative services); 
Adrianne Jeffries, Craigslist Losing Revenue from Housing Ads as Competition Heats Up, THE 
VERGE (Nov. 5, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2012/11/5/3592628/craigslist-housing-
revenue-decrease-aim-group [perma.cc/TJX9-DPN5] (describing decline in revenues from real estate 
listings). Craigslist uses a simple approach to allow sellers to post listings, and has not updated the 
simple interface as technology has evolved. See Hanna, supra. 
 168 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–33 (describing Congress’s intent in enacting the CDA and the 
negative effects on interactive service providers if Congress’s goals are not upheld); Hill, 727 S.E.2d 
at 559 (noting that the pricing tools and features are neutral tools). Notably, Craigslist has had defini-
tive success under the CDA. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(holding that the plaintiffs could pursue a public nuisance claim against Craigslist users who solicited 
prostitution, but not against Craigslist itself). 
 169 See Geron, supra note 167 (explaining that despite facing regulatory challenges, the sharing 
economy generated approximately $3.5 billion in revenue in 2013); Hanna, supra note 167; Lo-
giurato, supra note 107 (noting Airbnb’s reliance on the CDA immunity for the offering its e-
commerce service); Miller, supra note 165 (describing CDA immunity as one of the foundational 
principles to the middleman economy); Jeffries, supra note 167. 
 170 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (enumerating Congress’s findings and policy in enacting the 
CDA); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (explaining that Congress was clear in its intention to nurture the Inter-
net by limiting government interference); Massachusetts ex rel. P.K. v. Village Voice Media Hold-
ings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1047 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (noting that Congress left no doubt in the 
policy behind CDA immunity). 
 171 See infra notes 171–256 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 176–203 and accompanying text. 
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision in Fair Housing Council of San 
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, argues that courts should use a re-
quirement test if they are to use this framework, and then applies this test to 
StubHub’s practices.173 Section C explains why the Roommates.com test 
should be abandoned.174 Section D proposes a new, clearer test and applies it to 
StubHub’s practices.175 
A. The Plain Language of Section 230 of the CDA Supports Broad Immunity 
In its findings and policy in the text of the CDA, Congress explicitly recog-
nized the Internet’s increasingly important role in our society.176 The Internet 
increases the flow of information between its users and has allowed people to 
create communicative forums with user control.177 In order to promote and pre-
serve these benefits, Congress called for minimum government regulation.178 
Otherwise, when faced with liability and high monitoring costs, websites would 
simply limit user content at the outset, chilling speech.179 Therefore, Congress 
severely limited website liability for its users’ content.180 CDA immunity is not, 
however, absolute.181 A website will not be immune when it is actually an “in-
formation content provider” itself, meaning that it is responsible for “in whole or 
                                                                                                                           
 173 See infra notes 204–225 and accompanying text. 
 174 See infra notes 226–238 and accompanying text. 
 175 See infra notes 239–256 and accompanying text. 
 176 See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (2012) (explaining Congress’s 
findings and policy behind § 230); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31, 334 (4th Cir. 
1997) (explaining when congressional policy is explicitly stated in text of statute, a court must follow 
it); Massachusetts ex rel. P.K. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1047 
(E.D. Mo. 2011) (noting that Congress left no doubt in the policy behind CDA immunity). 
 177 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a). 
 178 See id. Section 230(a) states: 
The Congress finds the following: (1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and oth-
er interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an extraor-
dinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citi-
zens. (2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that 
they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology 
develops. 
Id. 
 179 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31 (explaining that websites would not inquire into the merit of 
take-down notices, and simply remove content upon request, thus chilling speech). 
 180 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(c); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31. The CDA has been interpreted to 
apply beyond just defamation cases. See Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 38, 41, 42 (2001) 
(holding that CDA immunity is not limited to tort claims and finding the defendant immune from a 
breach of contract claim). 
 181 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an interactive computer service loses 
immunity if it “materially contributes to the alleged unlawfulness” of the content). 
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in part . . . the creation or development” of information.182 Since the CDA’s en-
actment, courts have struggled to determine what the term “development means 
in this context.183 On the one hand it can mean “to make something new,” or 
more broadly it can mean “to make something available.”184 In Roommates.com, 
the Ninth Circuit looked towards Wikipedia for the definition of “web develop-
ment,” finding it most relevant to the context of the CDA.185 But, courts should 
not rely on this definition of web development because this definition encom-
passes traditional publisher duties that are explicitly protected by the CDA, such 
as “gathering, organizing and editing information.”186 
Because “development” can be stretched in different ways, the term 
should be interpreted in accordance with legislative intent.187 The statute’s ex-
plicit findings and policy clearly show that Congress intended to immunize 
websites from liability.188 Strictly interpreting the term “development” in line 
with Congress’s intent leads to website immunity unless the website actually 
                                                                                                                           
 182 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162–63 (explaining how a website 
operator can be both a service provider and a content provider). 
 183 See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 558–60 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that the 
vast majority of courts interpreting the CDA have held in favor of immunity); Doty, supra note 16, at 
128 (noting that the majority of litigation around CDA immunity is about when an interactive com-
puter service is also an information content provider so as to be responsible for the information). Un-
like the clear findings and policy of Congress, the definition of “information content provider” is 
vague. See Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (N.Y. 2011); Doty supra 
note 16, at 126 (noting that the bulk of litigation concerns what constitutes “development” of infor-
mation by an interactive computer service). In tackling the definition of “development” in part, some 
courts have looked towards the dictionary definition. See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 
1197–99 (10th Cir. 2009); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168–69 (looking to Wikipedia for the defini-
tion of “web development”). Yet the dictionary does not provide a consensus because “development” 
has many meanings. See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1197–98 (construing two dictionary definitions of 
“develop”); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168–69 (disagreeing with the dissent on the correct defini-
tion for “develop”). 
 184 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168–69. 
 185 See id. 
 186 Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1180, 1186 (McKeown, J., dis-
senting) (explaining that the majority’s definition of “web development” encompasses the type of 
functions that are explicitly associated with interactive computer services and protected under the 
statute); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (stating that claims attempting to hold websites liable for 
traditional publisher functions are meritless). These traditional publisher functions include analyzing, 
reorganizing, and filtering data. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168–69; id. 
at 1180, 1186 (McKeown, J., dissenting). 
 187 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174; id. at 1882, 1186 (McKeown, J., 
dissenting) (opining the majority’s definition is inventive and without relation to the statute); Village 
Voice, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (noting that Congress left no doubt in the policy behind CDA immuni-
ty). 
 188 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (explaining Congress’s policy to preserve and promote the growth 
of the Internet); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–32 (describing the congressional intent behind the CDA); 
Village Voice, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (following Congress’s explicit policy goals set forth in the 
CDA). 
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provides the content itself.189 But because the statute also included the terms 
“responsible” for, and “creation,” it would be redundant to interpret “develop-
ment” to mean “to make something new.”190 Therefore, courts should interpret 
“development” to mean “require,” for such a definition ensures that the term 
“create” retains meaning while also providing broad immunity and protecting 
e-commerce growth.191 
Largely overlooked, the plain language of the CDA provides further in-
sight into what types of activities should be immunized.192 The CDA definition 
of “interactive computer service” incorporates the term “access software pro-
vider.”193 The term “access software provider” is separately defined and in-
cludes any website that utilizes tools that “filter . . . analyze . . . digest . . . [or] 
reorganize” content.194 These actions are thus functions of an interactive com-
puter service and are protected by the CDA.195 Under the plain language of the 
CDA, any attempt to assign liability for filtering or reorganizing data is mis-
placed.196 
As the central function of marketplaces is to reorganize user data, CDA 
immunity should extend to StubHub, Uber, Airbnb, and all marketplaces in 
line with a proper interpretation of the Act’s plain language.197 StubHub’s pric-
                                                                                                                           
 189 See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 414–15 (6th Cir. 2014) (not-
ing than an encouragement test would too harshly cut at the immunity Congress established); Room-
mates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174; id. at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting that close cases must be 
resolved in favor of immunity). 
 190 See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1197–99 (interpreting the definitions of “development” as well as 
“responsible”); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168 (noting that the correct definition must give weight 
to the words “ responsible” and “creation” or else “development” would have no meaning within the 
statute). 
 191 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1880, 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (opining that the ma-
jority’s definition puts every website at risk for liability); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 23–
25 (emphasizing the danger of a too plaintiff-friendly standard for CDA immunity). 
 192 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), (f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1186 (McKeown, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that the actions of Roommates.com are explicitly protected under the CDA). 
 193 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), (f)(4) (defining “access software provider”). 
 194 Id. 
 195 See id.; Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1186 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (describing the func-
tions that are protected under the CDA). 
 196 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), (f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1186 (McKeown, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that these actions are explicitly within the domain of information content provider 
and are thus protected). 
 197 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(c), (f)(2), (f)(4) (stating Congress’s policy to promote the growth of 
the Internet); Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (noting that an encouragement test incorrectly illus-
trates what was at issue for Roommates.com); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 
591 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Consumeraffairs.com from Roommates.com be-
cause Consumeraffairs.com did not require information to be posted); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 
1183–86 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (opining that the majority’s definition puts every website at risk 
for liability); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 261 (holding that a website loses immunity when they “ensure the 
creation” of the content); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 24 (emphasizing the danger of a too 
plaintiff-friendly standard for CDA immunity); Goldman, supra note 124 (noting the risk of lack of 
immunity to all e-commerce marketplaces). StubHub reorganizes its user data, representing the market 
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ing recommendation tool compiles historical sales data, showing the low, aver-
age, and high prices for similar tickets.198 According to the CDA, reorganizing 
user data is not “developing” the information in part, but rather a protected 
action of an “interactive computer service”.199 
Finally, in order to further Congress’s policy goals, StubHub and other 
peer-to-peer marketplaces should be protected under the CDA.200 Congress 
sought to encourage the growth of the Internet through unfettered speech and 
limited liability.201 Placing liability on these marketplaces imposes exorbitant 
monitoring costs and defeats the purpose of an interactive middleman ser-
vice.202 Without CDA immunity, flourishing companies that offer tremendous 
value to customers and the economy may not exist as they currently do.203 
B. Moving On: Deconstructing the Roommates.com Test  
to Eliminate Ambiguity 
Despite the shortcomings of the Roommates.com “material contribution” 
test, many courts rely on it to determine when a website “develops” infor-
                                                                                                                           
in terms of supply and demand, explicitly protected by the CDA. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), (f)(4); 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1180, 1183 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (explaining that the actions taken 
by Roommates.com are explicitly protected under the CDA); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 
28 (arguing that StubHub simply reorganizes user data for its pricing tool). 
 198 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 28 (arguing StubHub compiles information but the 
ultimate price is left for the user to input); Cassidy, supra note 6 (describing the StubHub selling inter-
face). 
 199 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), (f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1183, 1186 (McKeown, J., 
dissenting) (opining that the function of reorganizing is explicitly protected under the CDA); Brief for 
Appellant, supra note 160, at 28 (describing StubHub’s actions as harmless). 
 200 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (stating Congress’s policy to promote the growth of the Internet); 
Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (holding StubHub immune under the CDA); Brief for Appellant, supra note 
160, at 2–3. 
 201 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (stating Congress’s policy to promote the growth of the Internet); 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31 (explaining Congress’s purpose in enacting the CDA). 
 202 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331, 333 (describing the negative impact that imposing notice liability 
would have on interactive computer services); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 559 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 
333); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 4 (arguing that placing liability on StubHub would have a 
harmful chilling effect on e-commerce). Congress has determined that liability should be confined to 
the user, rather than imposing monitoring costs on the websites. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(c) (stating 
policy to promote the growth of the Internet); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331, 333 (explaining Congress’s 
purpose in enacting the CDA). 
 203 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 23–25 (arguing that an encouragement test chills e-
commerce growth); Goldman, supra note 124 (noting the threat of lack of immunity to eBay); Geron, 
supra note 167 (noting the extreme growth of the sharing economy); Logiurato, supra note 107 
(showing legislators’ attempts to remove CDA immunity for Airbnb); Miller, supra note 165 (noting 
the dependence of Uber and Airbnb on CDA immunity); see also Justin Hughes, The Internet and the 
Persistence of Law, 44 B.C. L. REV. 359, 384–85 (2003) (explaining how imposing third-party liabil-
ity of websites can stunt the innovation and growth of the Internet). 
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mation “in part,” losing immunity.204 Courts diverge, however, as to whether 
encouragement of information or requirement of information precludes im-
munity.205 In order to provide predictability for websites going forward, courts 
must reach consistent judgments on CDA immunity.206 This section argues that 
if courts are to use the Roommates.com “material contribution” test, they 
should use a requirement approach.207 This section then applies this approach 
to StubHub’s practices.208 
 The Roommates.com “material contribution” test should be interpreted to 
mean that a website loses immunity if it requires unlawful content as opposed 
to encouraging or having knowledge of content.209 Despite its sporadic refer-
ences to a broader standard, the majority in Roommates.com based its holding 
on the fact that Roommates.com required unlawful content as a condition of 
service.210 The holding was a direct response to the thrust of the Fair Housing 
Council’s claims, that Roommates.com is not immune for requiring its users to 
violate the law.211 
If courts continue to use the Roommates.com test, they should discard 
immunity only when a website requires content because this approach strikes 
the right balance between protecting innovation and limiting CDA immunity 
when the website is truly responsible for the content.212 Although the CDA 
should not overly protect invasive and abusive uses of the Internet, such as 
revenge pornography and cyberbullying, there are other laws in place that pro-
                                                                                                                           
 204 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 412–14 (explaining that the district court’s encouragement would 
be more broad than any previous decision); Doty, supra note 16, at 131, 136 (explaining the different 
routes courts have gone in interpreting the Roommates.com test); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46. 
 205 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1176–78 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (stating that websites will be 
unsure of whether their actions are protected by the CDA); Doty, supra note 16, at 126–27 (describing 
how courts have taken different approaches in interpreting the Roommates.com test); Dyer, supra note 
16, at 845–46. 
 206 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1176–78 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting the unpredicta-
bility left as to whether an interactive service provider is immune under the CDA or not); Goldman, 
supra note 124 (noting the undesirable effect of split decisions on immunity); Doty, supra note 16, at 
126, 30–31 (detailing two ways to interpret the Roommates.com test); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46. 
 207 See infra notes 209–219 and accompanying text. 
 208 See infra notes 220–225 and accompanying text. 
 209 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (noting that a requirement test correctly illustrates what 
was at issue for Roommates.com); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (distinguishing the Roommates.com case 
because the website did not require information to be posted); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 559, 561 (holding a 
website loses immunity when they “ensure the creation” of the content). 
 210 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165 (agreeing with the plaintiff’s claim that requiring users 
to disclose sexual orientation makes Roommates.com an information content provider). 
 211 See id. 
 212 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (relying on the fact that Roommates.com required re-
sponses to its questionnaire as central to the court’s holding); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (distinguishing 
Consumersaffairs.com from Roommates.com because Consumeraffairs.com did not require infor-
mation to be posted); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting); Hill, 727 S.E.2d 
at 261 (quoting Shiamilli, 952 N.E.2d at 1019). 
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vide legal remedies to such victims.213 Moreover, because the CDA exempts 
from its reach any criminal law claim or intellectual property claim, a website 
cannot assert the CDA as an affirmative defense when met with claims of these 
types.214 Additionally, CDA immunity is strictly about vicarious liability; the 
victim still has the opportunity to seek recourse against the user who violated 
the law.215 If a website requires illegal conduct, it will be responsible through 
vicarious liability, but any more relaxed standard potentially chills innovation 
and free speech.216 
An encouragement or inducement standard can always be manipulated to 
impose liability on a website for having some influence on a user’s content.217 
This “but-for” analysis will cause websites and their users to be “joined at the 
hip” for legal liability.218 Instead, courts should discard CDA immunity only if 
the website requires the content.219 
Applying this interpretation of the Roommates.com holding, StubHub 
should retain immunity under the CDA because it does not require users to 
post illegal content.220 StubHub’s LargeSellers program involving fee waivers 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (excluding criminal and copyright law from the CDA’s coverage); 
Franks, supra note 107 (noting the availability of criminal law and copyright law); Mullin, supra note 
107 (noting the availability of copyright law). 
 214 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (exempting from the Act’s coverage criminal and copyright law); 
Franks, supra note 107 (describing how plaintiffs can pursue claims through criminal and copyright 
law); Mullin, supra note 107 (noting the possibility of pursuing a copyright law claim). 
 215 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (providing no immunity for an information content provider); Franks, 
supra note 107 (explaining that the CDA provides no immunity for an information content provider). 
 216 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (noting that an encouragement test incorrectly illustrates 
what was at issue for Roommates.com); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (discussing how the fact that the 
Rommates.com questionnaire was a required condition of service was essential to Roommates.com 
being found liable); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting); Blumenthal v. 
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.D.C. 1998) (explaining Congress’s choice to provide broad im-
munity); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (quoting Shiamilli, 952 N.E.2d at 1019); Brief for Appellant, supra 
note 160, at 23–25 (arguing that an encouragement test chills e-commerce growth). 
 217 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 (noting that close cases must be resolved in favor of 
immunity because a clever lawyer could argue that just about anything encouraged illegal conduct); 
id. at 1183 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s definition of ‘development’ would transform 
every interactive site into an information content provider and the result would render illusory any 
immunity under § 230(c).”). 
 218 Id. at 1176–77 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (arguing that an encouragement test is similar to a 
“but-for” analysis because a lawyer could always argue that something the website did influenced the 
third-party content). 
 219 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (noting that an encouragement test incorrectly illustrates 
what was at issue for Roommates.com); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (holding that Consumeraffairs.com 
did not require information, and is thus immune under the CDA); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 
1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (discarding CDA immunity because defendant took clear act in establish-
ing contract with third-party); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (holding a website loses immunity when they 
“ensure the creation” of the content); Doty, supra note 16, at 141 (noting most courts only discard 
immunity when the website explicitly requests the content in question). 
 220 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 558. Additionally, the court in NPS held that the masking ability given 
to LargeSellers was not sufficient to succeed on a common law misrepresentation claim because the 
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and location masking is not a requirement as a condition of service.221 Whereas 
the Roommates.com discriminatory questionnaire and answers automatically 
violated the FHA, StubHub’s users can still price their tickets under face value 
if they choose.222 StubHub’s suggested pricing tool is based on market prices, 
not face value prices, and ultimately allows sellers to enter any price they 
wish.223 Additionally, the CDA definition of a protected “interactive computer 
service” includes any tools that “filter . . . analyze . . . [or] organize” content.224 
Thus, StubHub’s display of its user data into a market-based pricing tool is 
explicitly protected.225 
C. Ejected: Why the Roommates.com “Material Contribution” 
Test Should Be Abandoned 
The Roommates.com test may be the most commonly used approach to 
determining CDA immunity, but it is fundamentally flawed and should be 
abandoned.226 Focusing on the alleged unlawfulness when determining CDA 
                                                                                                                           
seller did not mask any information from the buyer, just the Patriots. NPS, LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 25 
Mass. L. Rptr. 478, 482 (Super. Ct. 2009). 
 221 See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 483 (holding that StubHub simply encourages LargeSellers to 
buy tickets with fee waivers). 
 222 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 558, 560 (distinguishing the facts from Roommates.com because 
Roommates.com required certain content); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 4–5 (noting that 
StubHub simply aggregates market prices based on supply and demand). 
 223 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 558, 560 (noting that StubHub does not require users to input certain 
content, whereas Roommates.com does); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 4–5 (noting that 
StubHub just complies data, leaving the user the choice of which price to enter). 
 224 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), (f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1186 (McKeown, J., dissent-
ing) (opining that the actions taken by Roommates.com are explicitly protected under the CDA). 
 225 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), (f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1186 (McKeown, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that the CDA’s definition of “access software provider” explicitly protects the actions 
for which Roommates.com was held liable); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 28 (noting that 
StubHub only reorganizes user data). Even against a broader encouragement or inducement test, 
StubHub’s practices simply encourage market-based pricing, not necessarily in violation of scalping 
laws. See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 244; Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 4–5 (arguing that even ap-
plying an encouragement test, StubHub simply encourages market prices); Rovell, supra note 6; Ru-
bin, supra note 12; Sloane, supra note 12 (noting the availability of Yankees tickets on StubHub be-
low face value). For many markets, StubHub’s market-based pricing offers prices far below face value 
and thus not in violation of scalping laws. See Rovell, supra note 6; Rubin, supra note 12; Sloane, 
supra note 12; Tuttle, supra note 112 (noting that Miami Marlins tickets on StubHub sell for far less 
than from the team). Although StubHub’s omission of face value price and price-dependent revenue 
model could indicate willful blindness, Congress enacted the CDA to provide immunity stemming 
from even actual knowledge of unlawful content. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332–33 (rejecting liability 
upon notice because of the exorbitant monitoring costs Congress intended to remove); Doty, supra 
note 16, at 137–38 (explaining that holding interactive service providers liable for willful blindness is 
a departure from previous holdings). 
226 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (stating Congress’s policy to promote the growth of the inter-
net and limit government intervention); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 (holding “close cases 
. . . must be resolved in favor of immunity, lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing 
websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or en-
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immunity is the wrong inquiry.227 Determining whether a website has “materi-
ally contributed to the alleged unlawfulness” requires an analysis into the 
cause of action.228 Yet, the CDA simply focuses on information and whether 
that information can be attributed to the website, regardless of its alleged un-
lawfulness.229 Determining immunity by whether a website has “materially 
contributed” to the unlawfulness collapses two distinct questions of infor-
mation development and substantive liability.230 At the motion to dismiss stage, 
unlawfulness has not yet been determined.231 
A new test for immunity should focus solely on how a website contributes 
to the information of a third party, regardless of the content’s alleged unlaw-
fulness.232 The CDA says nothing about alleged unlawfulness, but simply fo-
cuses on whether the information in question can be attributed to the web-
site.233 The ineffectiveness of the Roommates.com test’s focus on alleged un-
lawfulness can be highlighted by a simple example.234 If a website requires a 
user to post harmless information, like what the weather is like outside, it is 
immune.235 But, if a website requires a user to answer discriminatory questions 
                                                                                                                           
couraged—or at least tacitly assented to—the illegality of third parties”); Doty, supra note 16, at 
126–27 (explaining the different approaches courts have taken in applying the Roommates.com 
test). There is no reference to unlawfulness in the text of the CDA and thus the Roommates.com 
majority is conflating an issue of immunity with an issue of substantive liability. See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230; Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting). 
 227 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177–78, 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (opining that 
the majority combines the immunity analysis with substantive legal analysis). 
 228 See id. 
 229 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b), (f) (lacking any discussion of alleged unlawfulness); Room-
mates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177–78, 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting the CDA says nothing 
about alleged unlawfulness). 
 230 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1183 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (describing these two ques-
tion as “analytically independent”); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (explaining that the CDA prohib-
its courts from welcoming claims that attempt to place liability on an interactive service provider for 
traditional publisher functions). 
 231 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177–78, 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that the issue of immunity for content and substantive liability for that content are two separate is-
sues). 
 232 See id. (explaining that there is no basis for focusing on the illegality of the content when 
determining whether an interactive computer service has contributed to that information in part); see 
also Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 416 (holding that although the plaintiff is responsible for the content he 
writes or requires, that content is not alleged to be defamatory). 
 233 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b), (f) (lacking any discussion of alleged unlawfulness); Room-
mates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177–78, 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (opining that whether the in-
formation in question is illegal bears no influence in CDA analysis). 
 234 See infra notes 235–238 and accompanying text. 
 235 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414 (noting than an encouragement test incorrectly illustrates 
what was at issue for Roommates.com); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (interpreting Roommates.com as 
holding the website liable because it required unlawful content); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–
68 (holding that a website loses immunity if it materially contributes to the content’s alleged unlaw-
fulness). 
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violating the FHA, it is not immune.236 In either scenario, the website has “de-
veloped” the information “in part” by requiring that information and thus fits 
the definition of an “information content provider,” but only one of the web-
sites is immune.237 CDA immunity should not depend on the alleged unlawful-
ness of the information, but should instead be based on whether the website is 
an “information content provider,” as the statute clearly sets out.238 
D. A Clear Act Guaranteeing the Production of the Content 
A new test is needed to eliminate the ambiguity left by the Room-
mates.com “material contribution” test.239 A website should lose CDA immuni-
ty only when it takes a clear act guaranteeing the production of the content.240 
This proposed test cements Congress’s policy to protect free-flowing infor-
mation and Internet growth while also discarding website immunity when the 
website is truly responsible for the content.241 If a website writes the content 
                                                                                                                           
 236 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169–70 (holding Roommates.com liable for requiring users 
to answer discriminatory questions in violation of the FHA); see also Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (ex-
plaining the holding of Roommates.com and noting that the website was not immune because it re-
quired users to input illegal information). 
 237 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 410 (arguing that the fact that Roommates.com required infor-
mation was most fatal in its losing immunity); Nemet, 591 F.3d. at 257–58 (interpreting Room-
mates.com as holding the website liable because it required unlawful content); Roommates.com, 521 
F.3d at 1167–68 (holding that a website loses immunity if it materially contributes to the content’s 
alleged unlawfulness). 
 238 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b), (f) (omitting any consideration of unlawfulness in Congress’s 
framework for immunity); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177–78, 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that immunity should depend solely on the degree of contribution to the information, regard-
less of its alleged unlawfulness). 
 239 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (stating the policy of Congress to promote the growth of the Inter-
net); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1176–78 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (stating “interactive service 
providers are left scratching their heads and wondering where immunity ends and liability begins”); 
Goldman, supra note 124 (noting the risk that a lack of immunity poses for e-commerce); Doty, supra 
note 16, at 126, 30–31 (stating that “the case law seems to reflect two different approaches to defining 
culpable behavior”); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46; Weslander, supra note 16, at 291–95. 
 240 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (noting that an encouragement test incorrectly illustrates 
what was at issue for Roommates.com); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (distinguishing the case at hand from 
the Roommates.com case because Consumeraffairs.com did not require information to be posted); 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting); Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 52–53 (ex-
plaining Congress’s choice to provide broad immunity); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (quoting Shiamilli, 
952 N.E.2d at 1019); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 23–25 (arguing that an encouragement 
test chills e-commerce growth). 
 241 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (stating Congress’s policy to minimize government intervention); 
Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (noting that a requirement test correctly illustrates what was at issue 
for Roommates.com); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (holding that Consumeraffairs.com is immune under the 
Roommates.com test); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting); Drudge, 992 
F. Supp. at 52–53 (explaining Congress’s choice to provide broad immunity); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561 
(quoting Shiamilli, 952 N.E.2d at 1019); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 23–25 (asserting that 
an encouragement test threatens innovation in e-commerce). 
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itself, it is responsible for the “creation” of that content.242 If a website takes 
some other clear act guaranteeing the production of content, it directly causes 
that content and is responsible for the “development” of that content.243 
Interpreting “development” to mean “a clear act guaranteeing its produc-
tion” more clearly delineates between immunity and liability.244 Examples of 
clear acts guaranteeing the production of content include requiring content, but 
also sponsoring it, paying for it, or mandating it through a user agreement.245 
When a website commits a clear act of this kind it loses its immunity because 
Congress enacted the CDA to protect websites from third-party liability, not 
from a website’s own conduct.246 By discarding CDA immunity for certain acts 
beyond just requiring content, this test strikes a balance for those concerned 
with privacy and harassment.247 Conversely, this test protects the plain lan-
guage definition of “access software provider” because filtering or reorganiz-
ing data does not guarantee the creation of user content.248 Finally, this test 
                                                                                                                           
 242 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 (holding Roommates.com liable for the content of its 
questions because it undoubtedly created the content); Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 
F. Supp. 2d 450, 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“While an overt act of creation of content is easy to identify, 
determining what makes a party responsible for the ‘development’ of content under § 230(f)(3) is 
unclear.”). 
 243 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f); Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (refusing to adopt an encour-
agement standard); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (upholding CDA immunity); Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 
1204 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (opining that Accusearch should simply be held liable for its con-
duct); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (holding 
a website is responsible for information if it “control[s]” or “ensure[s]” the creation of content). 
 244 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1187 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting the vagueness of the 
majority’s test for immunity). 
 245 See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1204 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (opining that Accusearch 
should simply be held liable for its conduct in acquiring the information at hand); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 
1107 (holding defendant liable as a promisor); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 (holding Room-
mates.com liable for requiring unlawful answers). For example, under this proposed test, AOL would 
be responsible for the content in the “Drudge Report” because of its act of directly paying for the 
content. See Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 47, 51. Imposing liability for directly paying for content helps 
achieve a balance between free speech and being overprotective of speech that raises privacy con-
cerns. See Franks, supra note 107 (voicing concerns about overprotection of CDA immunity for 
online abuse); Bolson, supra note 107 (voicing concerns about overprotection of CDA immunity for 
privacy). 
 246 See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1204 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (distinguishing between the 
acts that the website took from their development of the content); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107 (holding 
defendant liable as a promisor); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 (holding Roommates.com liable 
for requiring unlawful answers). 
 247 See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1204 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (arguing that Accusearch 
should simply be held liable for its conduct); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107 (holding defendant liable in its 
actions as promisor, distinct from its development of content under traditional CDA analysis); Room-
mates.com, 521 F.3d at 1664 (holding Roommates.com liable for information that it required its users 
to provide as a condition of service).  
 248 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), (f)(4) (including “access software provider” within the definition of 
“information content provider”); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1186 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that these actions are explicitly within the domain of information content provider and thus 
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continues to disregard knowledge as a factor because the CDA was intended to 
remove the monitoring costs stemming from liability upon knowledge.249 
Under this test, a marketplace like StubHub will unambiguously be pro-
tected under the CDA because it does not commit a clear act guaranteeing the 
production of the content.250 StubHub does not require the price to be above 
face value or pay users to post prices above face value, nor does it mandate it 
through its user agreement.251 StubHub’s LargeSellers program involving fee 
waivers and location masking is optional, and does not guarantee a user will 
price above face value. 252 StubHub’s reorganization of its users’ data is explic-
itly protected under the CDA.253 Any knowledge of a user’s scalping violation 
is irrelevant under CDA analysis because it imposes exorbitant monitoring 
costs, contrary to Congress’s intent.254 
This test strikes the right balance between protecting innovation and lim-
iting CDA immunity when the website is truly responsible for the content.255 
CDA jurisprudence is predictable for most interactive computer services, yet it 
must be predictable for peer-to-peer marketplaces as well to protect growth 
and innovation.256 
                                                                                                                           
protected); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 28 (arguing that StubHub simply aggregates market 
prices based on supply and demand). 
 249 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333; Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 558 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333). 
 250 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (holding that StubHub did not direct the price of the ticket listing 
in question); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 27, 31 (noting that StubHub simply aggregates 
market prices based on supply and demand). Additionally, the court in NPS held that the masking 
ability given to LargeSellers was not enough to bring a common law misrepresentation claim because 
the seller did not mask any information from the buyer, just the Patriots. NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 
482. 
 251 See Weinstein v. eBay, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 219, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting deceptive 
business practice claim because StubHub simply follows the forces of supply and demand); Hill, 727 
S.E.2d at 562 (disagreeing with the trial court’s holding that StubHub’s “controlled” the transaction); 
Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 27, 31 (noting that StubHub simply aggregates market prices 
based on supply and demand). 
 252 See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 483 (noting StubHub was willfully blind to the existence of 
above face value tickets on its website, but never required LargeSellers to list above face value); see 
also Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 562 (describing StubHub’s actions as simply reorganizing market data, while 
the seller ultimately having control over the price input). 
 253 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), (f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1186 (McKeown, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that these actions are explicitly those of an “access software provider” and thus with-
in the domain of a protected information content provider). 
 254 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (rejecting liability upon notice); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 558 (quoting 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333). 
 255 See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1204 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (explaining that Accusearch 
should be liable for its conduct, outside of the scope of CDA analysis, rather than its development of 
the content); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107 (holding defendant liable for its role a promisor, not as a de-
veloper of information); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1664 (holding Roommates.com liable for re-
quiring unlawful answers). 
 256 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (describing Congress’s policy to promote growth of the Internet 
and minimize government intervention); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1183, 87 (McKeown, J., dis-
senting) (expressing concern about the scope of the majority’s opinion); Jonathan Band & Matthew 
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CONCLUSION 
Immunity under the Communications Decency Act should be applied 
broadly, supporting Congress’s intent to limit government intervention and 
foster the growth of the Internet. Although this generally has been the case, the 
vagueness of the Roommates.com holding leaves the door open for rogue deci-
sions and a denial of immunity for StubHub and other peer-to-peer market-
places. In the least, courts should interpret Roommates.com to mean a website 
loses immunity when it requires the content in question. To eliminate this am-
biguity, Courts should adopt a new test that a website only loses CDA immuni-
ty when it takes a clear act guaranteeing the production of the content. Like the 
requirement test, this test provides predictability for websites claiming CDA 
immunity. Conversely, this test does not protect websites who pay for content 
or take other clear acts guaranteeing content, and thus strikes a balance for 
those concerned with the potential reach of CDA immunity. An unambiguous 
test that grants broad immunity is necessary for the growth of StubHub and 
other peer-to-peer marketplaces. 
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Schruers, Symposium, Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane: The Communications Decency 
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124 (opining that all marketplaces who encourage equilibrium market places could be liable under the 
NPS encouragement test); Geron, supra note 167 (describing the extreme growth of the sharing econ-
omy); Miller, supra note 165 (detailing the dependence of Uber and Airbnb on CDA immunity). 
